Abstract. In this article, the RIPEMD-160 hash function is studied in detail. To analyze the hash function, we have extended existing approaches and used recent results in cryptanalysis. While RIPEMD and RIPEMD-128 reduced to 3 rounds are vulnerable to the attack, it is not feasible for RIPEMD-160. Furthermore, we present an analytical attack on a round-reduced variant of the RIPEMD-160 hash function. To the best of our knowledge this is the first article that investigates the impact of recent advances in cryptanalysis of hash functions on RIPEMD-160.
Introduction
Recent results in cryptanalysis show weaknesses in commonly used hash functions, such as RIPEMD, MD5, Tiger, SHA-0, and SHA-1 [1, 2, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14] . Therefore, the analysis of alternative hash functions, like RIPEMD-160, the SHA-2 family, and Whirlpool is of great interest. Since RIPEMD-160 is part of the ISO/IEC 10118-3:2003 standard on dedicated hash functions, it is used in many applications and is recommended in several other standards as an alternative to SHA-1. Based on the similar design of RIPEMD-160, MD5, SHA-1, and its predecessor RIPEMD, one might doubt the security of RIPEMD-160. Therefore, we investigated the impact of recent attack methods on RIPEMD-160 in detail. We are not aware of any other published analysis with respect to collision attacks of the RIPEMD-160 hash function. In the analysis of the RIPEMD-160 hash function we have extended existing approaches using recent results in cryptanalysis. In the analysis, we show that methods successfully used to attack SHA-1 are not applicable to full RIPEMD-160. Furthermore, we use analytical methods to produce a collision in a RIPEMD-160 variant reduced to 3 rounds. However, no attack has been found for the original RIPEMD-160 hash function. In summary, we can state that RIPEMD-160 is secure against known attack methods. Nevertheless, further analysis is required to get a good view on the security of RIPEMD-160.
The work in this paper has been supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), project P18138. The remainder of this article is structured as follows. A description of the RIPEMD-160 hash function is given in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we give an overview of existing attacks on RIPEMD, the predecessor of RIPEMD-160. In Section 2.3, the basic attack strategy we use in our analysis is described. Section 3 presents the results of the analysis following this attack strategy. In Section 4, we describe some methods for improving the results of the analysis. Moreover, we present a theoretical attack on a simplified variant of RIPEMD-160 reduced to 3 rounds using analytical methods in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
Finding Collisions for RIPEMD-160
In this section, we will give a short description of the RIPEMD-160 hash function. We will present the basic strategy we used for the attack on RIPEMD-160 and we will show why existing attacks on RIPEMD are not applicable to RIPEMD-160. For the remainder of the article we will follow the notation given in Table 1 .
Short Description of RIPEMD-160
The RIPEMD-160 hash function was proposed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel in [8] to replace RIPEMD. It is an iterative hash function that processes 512-bit input message blocks and produces a 160-bit hash value. Like its predecessor RIPEMD, it consists of two parallel streams. In each stream the state variables are updated according to the expanded message word w i and combined with the initial value IV after the last step, depicted in Figure 1 . While RIPEMD consists of two parallel streams of MD4, the two streams are designed differently in the case of RIPEMD-160.
In the following, we briefly describe the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm. The hash function basically consists of two parts: message expansion and state update transformation. A detailed description is given in [8] .
Message Expansion. The message expansion of RIPEMD-160 is a permutation of the message words in each round, where different permutations are used for the left and the right stream.
State Update Transformation. The state update transformation starts from a (fixed) initial value IV of five 32-bit registers and updates them in 5 rounds of
